Kiyotaki and Wright 1989 developed a simple dynamic model of an exchange economy in which one or more commodities are used as media of exchange. In this paper, we report ndings from an experiment that implements the Kiyotaki Wright model. We consider whether the equilibrium predictions of the Kiyotaki-Wright model are robust to the dynamics created by out of equilibrium play. In particular, we examine whether individuals placed in the Kiyotaki Wright e n vironment learn over time to adopt the same commodities as media of exchange as the model implies will be used in equilibrium. We nd that subjects have a strong tendency to play fundamental" rather than speculative" strategies even in environments where speculative strategies would lead to higher payo s. We examine some possible motivations for subjects' trading behavior and nd that subjects are mainly motivated by their own past payo experience as opposed to being motivated by the marketability concerns that the theory suggests are important.
Introduction
One of the most important conventions a society develops is the acceptance of at least one object as a`medium of exchange'. An object becomes a medium of exchange when many agents who have no interest in that object for their own consumption or use in production nevertheless accept the object in trade with the rational expectation that they will be able to trade it for goods which are of intrinsic value to themselves. In this sense, a conventional medium of exchange must be supported by a Nash equilibrium. We all know when some commodity has acquired the status of a medium of exchange. The challenge to monetary theorists is to identify the factors that determine which objects will acquire this status. Kiyotaki and Wright 1989 provide a model of an economy with individuals of several types where di erent commodities may emerge as media of exchange. 1 In this model each player type is de ned by a pair of goods the good a type consumes and the good a type produces. No type produces the good it desires to consume and there does not exist any pair of types in which each type produces what the other type wishes to consume. Each agent has one unit of storage capacity. If an individual has his own consumption good in storage, it is immediately consumed and replaced by that individual's production good. Therefore, each agent has in storage either a unit of his production good or a unit of a good other than his consumption good. At the beginning of each period, agents are randomly paired. If they mutually agree, the pair may exchange inventories. Therefore, consumption is only possible if at least some trades take place in which at least one agent accepts a good which that agent does not consume. Such goods are considered media of exchange and are identi ed via the equilibrium trading strategies of the agents and by the patterns of trade and inventory holdings induced by those strategies.
In the Kiyotaki Wright model, di erent goods have di erent storage costs. Therefore, whenever an agent is paired with someone who does not have that agent's consumption good in storage the agent m ust decide which o f t wo goods that di er in their storage costs it would be better to hold. The number of periods that will pass before an agent meets someone who both has that agent's consumption good in storage and is willing to accept in exchange the good the agent has in storage is itself dependent on which good the agent has in storage. Therefore, the decision regarding 1 Kiyotaki and Wright 1989 and Aiyagari and Wallace 1992 also consider the possibility that at objects serves as a media of exchange. In this paper, we focus on the emergence of commodity money as a medium of exchange. An experimental investigation of the emergence of at objects as media of exchange is provided in Du y and Ochs 1998. which good to hold in storage involves weighing the di erences in the storage costs of the goods against the di erences in their marketability." Kiyotaki and Wright provide a characterization of the equilibrium properties of two v ersions of their model. They provide conditions under which various goods will serve as media of exchange in equilibrium. These conditions depend on the distribution of storage costs, the utility v alue of consumption and the discount factor. What makes the Kiyotaki Wright model important for monetary theory is that it can account for the existence of multiple media of exchange, some of which are dominated in rate of return the nancial asset analog of storage cost by other possible media.
The interesting equilibria arise when parameter values imply that one or more types adopt speculative" trading strategies. A speculative strategy is one in which an agent accepts in trade a good with a higher storage cost than the good that agent is currently holding. The agent speculates that by incurring a higher storage cost in this period he will experience a shorter wait before being able to e ect a trade for his consumption good. In those parameter conditions in which the equilibria imply that high storage cost goods are used as media of exchange such speculative" beliefs are, of course, self ful lling. Speculative trading strategies stand in contrast to fundamental" trading strategies. A fundamental strategy is one in which an agent will accept in trade only those goods that have a l o wer storage cost than the good the agent is currently storing. This strategy is considered fundamental in that the agent considers only the fundamental factor the storage cost of a good when deciding whether or not to trade for that good. Like speculative strategies, fundamental strategies are self ful lling only in those environments where parameter conditions imply that low storage cost goods are used as media of exchange. Kiyotaki and Wright 1989 only provide a characterization of the equilibrium properties of their model. They do not attempt to describe the process by which an equilibrium is achieved or, equivalently, give an account o f h o w one or more commodities emerge as conventional media of exchange. As with other equilibrium analyses, this leaves open the question of whether or not the equilibria are likely to be achieved by agents who, almost certainly, do not start a process of social interaction with equilibrium beliefs but who must adjust their strategies to their evolving historical experiences within a given trading regime. Such a question can only be satisfactorily addressed by actually bringing people together in an environment speci ed by the model and observing their behavior.
An Experimental Study
This paper reports results from an experiment w e h a ve conducted that implements several parameterizations of the Kiyotaki and Wright 1989 environment. Our aim in conducting this experiment is to address the question of whether the equilibrium predictions of the Kiyotaki Wright model are robust to the dynamics created by out of equilibrium play.
Our experimental design uses two principal treatment v ariables. One treatment v ariable is the distribution of production goods assigned to types. The two possible distributions, described below, are referred to as model A and model B following Kiyotaki and Wright 1989 . A second treatment v ariable is the payo value, or utility v alue, of an agent's consumption good. Under model A, the utility v alue of consumption is set either at a level that is consistent with fundamental behavior by all player types in equilibrium or with speculative behavior on the part of some types in equilibrium. Under model B, the utility v alue is set either to a value that is consistent with fundamental behavior by all player types in equilibrium or to a value that is consistent with either fundamental or speculative behavior by v arious types in equilibrium. In addition to these treatment variables, we also test whether manipulations in the form of public knowledge or the distribution of initial inventory holdings have a n y systematic e ect on behavior.
We nd, contrary to the theory, that in model A the aggregate relative frequency with which all types choose the fundamental strategy is una ected by the choice of parameter values or by the manner in which goods are initially distributed over types. When model B is played, the aggregate relative frequency of selection of the fundamental strategy is also essentially the same, regardless of whether the parameters imply a unique equilibrium in which only fundamental strategies are predicted, or whether the parameters imply a multiplicity of equilibria, where selection of speculative strategies might be expected.
The theoretical equilibrium is predicated upon strategy selection that is conditioned on the di erences in holding costs relative to the di erences in the marketability of di erent commodities. Therefore, we i n vestigate the way in which individuals respond to the kinds of information available to them. Our investigation suggests that in selecting a strategy, a vailable information on the relative marketability of di erent goods i.e. the percentage of the population of each t ype that, on average, is holding a given player's consumption good does not in uence a player's strategy choice. Given this behavior, it is not surprising that strategy selection is unresponsive to parameter variations that change the theoretical equilibrium. We propose and test a simple model of strategy selection to account for the pattern of behavior we observe.
Comparison with Previous Analyses
The robustness of the Kiyotaki Wright model's predictions to out of equilibrium behavior has been previously examined by Marimon, McGrattan and Sargent 1990 who used a version of Holland's 1986 classi er system to model how a population of arti cially intelligent players might interact in the Kiyotaki Wright e n vironment. They found that the arti cial agents had no di culty learning to play fundamental strategies. However, in environments where the unique pure strategy equilibrium involves speculative trading strategies, the arti cially intelligent agents failed to adopt these speculative trading strategies, and continued to play fundamental strategies. Marimon et al. comment on the failure of their algorithm to learn to play speculative strategies:
In the limit, the arti cially intelligent agents should behave as long run average payo maximizers...but The behavior of our arti cially intelligent agents can be very myopic at the beginning...and this early myopia might h a ve a p e r v erse e ect..."
That is, play of a speculative strategy involves accepting a lower current p a yo higher storage cost in exchange for a higher expected future payo . Without su cient experience of high payo s from speculation, the speculative strategies get selected against early on and die out."
Motivated by Marimon et al.'s ndings, Brown 1996 conducted an experimental test of the Kiyotaki Wright model's predictions using human subjects. These experiments involved only model version A and were parameterized in a way that would call for speculative behavior by t ype 1 players in the unique pure strategy equilibrium. Brown nds that less than one half of player type 1s chose speculative strategies when it was optimal for them to do so. He also found that one sixth of player type 3s played the speculative strategy even though the unique pure strategy equilibrium of model A requires that all player type 3s play the fundamental strategy.
While we obtain aggregate results that are similar to the results obtained by Marimon et al. and Brown, our experimental investigation di ers from these earlier studies in several respects. First, as mentioned above, we use an experimental design where we v ary both the version of the model and the parameterizations of these di erent v ersions. By contrast, Brown considered only a single version of the Kiyotaki Wright model model A and a single parameterization of this version of the model. Second, we are interested not only in aggregate behavior, which is the main focus of the Brown and Marimon et al. studies, but also in the motivations for why individual subjects choose particular strategies. We therefore develop a simple model of individual learning behavior which we i n vestigate using data collected from the experiment. Finally, there are important di erences between Brown's experimental design and our own. Brown's experimental design was motivated by the work of Marimon et al. and was therefore set up so as to replicate the environment i n which the arti cially intelligent agents played the game. The di culty with this implementation is that it leaves out certain features of the Kiyotaki Wright model that would seem to be important to players' ability t o a c hieve coordination on a Nash equilibrium, especially one that involves speculative trading strategies. For instance, in the Marimon et al. and Brown environments , no e ort is made to implement discounting, as the theory requires. Furthermore, in the Brown experiment, no attempt is made to control for subjects' risk attitudes. Most importantly, in the Brown and Marimon et al. environments, the notion that players have common knowledge of the strategies of other players is not implemented. The absence of such common knowledge may limit the ability of players in a disequilibrium setting to achieve coordination on a Nash equilibrium.
This point has been emphasized in related work by Sethi 1996 . He shows that all of the pure strategy equilibria identi ed in the Kiyotaki and Wright 1989 model including equilibria where some player types are called on to play speculative strategies are asymptotically stable with respect to a disequilibrium, evolutionary dynamic that encompasses a large class of selection dynamics. This evolutionary dynamic can only operate in environments where agents have access to population wide information that enables them to assess the relative performance of the strategies they are playing.
An important feature of our experimental design is that we h a ve made an e ort to provide subjects with this kind of population wide information. In particular, we always provide subjects with common knowledge of su cient statistics for the distribution of strategies that have been played. In some sessions, we provide subjects with additional, population wide strategic information. We h a ve also implemented discounting and have attempted to control for subjects' risk attitudes in contrast to the earlier studies. We therefore view our experimental design as being a closer approximation to the Kiyotaki Wright e n vironment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the versions of the Kiyotaki Wright e n vironment that we study and provides the conditions under which the various pure strategy equilibria exist. Section 3 provides the details of our experimental design. In section 4 we consider some aggregate characteristics of the experimental data and compare these results with the theoretical predictions of the model. In section 5, we present a results from a regression analysis that is intended to shed some light on the possible motivations for the trading behavior of the subjects. Finally, section six concludes the paper with a summary of the major ndings.
2 The Kiyotaki Wright E n vironment In the Kiyotaki Wright model, a population of N players is divided up equally into one of three types. 2 There are also three indivisible goods. A player of type i = 1 ; 2; 3 has access to a technology that produces good j = 1 ; 2; 3 where i 6 = j. I n m o d e l A t ype i = 1 ; 2; 3 produces good j = 2 ; 3; 1 while in model B type i = 1 ; 2; 3 produces good j = 3 ; 1; 2. In both of these models, players of type i receive positive utility only from consumption of good i. T h us, player 1 desires good 1, player 2 desires good 2, and player 3 desires good 3. The production possibilities of models A and B are designed to motivate indirect exchange of goods between agents of di erent t ypes. In addition to a production technology, agents have access to a storage technology that allows each agent to store one unit of any good in every period. Storage is costly, and the costs di er according to which good is stored. Denoting the cost of storing good j by c j , the storage costs that all players face are such that c 3 c 2 c 1 0.
In every period or trading round, all players are randomly paired and each pair may c hoose to trade the goods they have in storage. Trades must be mutually agreed upon by both players and involve one for one swaps of goods in inventory. If one or both members of a pair do not want t o trade, no trade occurs and the two players end the trading round storing the same good they held at the beginning of the round. When a player of type i successfully trades for his consumption good i he immediately consumes that good and produces a unit of his production good. Therefore, no player ever stores the good he desires to consume; the good held in storage will either be the player's production good or the good the player neither produces nor desires to consume. Players receive utility from consumption in the amount u c 3 . They also incur costs for storing their production good c i , where i denotes the production good of type i. When a player successfully trades for his consumption good and produces a unit of his production good, he earns positive net utility for the round in the amount u , c i . The other two possibilities are that a trade is made but 2 More precisely, Kiyotaki and Wright assume a continuum of players of unit mass, but for our purposes, it will be necessary to assume a nite population size. The model can be generalized to allow for more than three player types as in Aiyagari and Wallace 1991, or to allow agents to choose their own ty p e a s i n W right 1995. the player does not receive his consumption good in trade or that trade does not occur. In either of these two cases, the player's net utility for the round is negative and is given by ,c j where j is the good the player had in storage as of the end of the trading round.
Players maximize the discounted expected value of net utility o ver an in nite horizon by c hoice of optimal trading strategies." The discount factor, 2 0; 1, is assumed to be common across types. A trading strategy is a rule that determines whether player type i holding good j o ers to trade good j for some other good k. The players' problem is solved by applying standard dynamic programming techniques and by searching over all possible stationary pure strategies. 3 The solution to this problem can be characterized by the di erent proportions of agents storing the three goods in a steady state equilibrium. Denote by p ij , the proportion of type i agents storing good j and note that for agents of type i, p ii = 0 b y design. It follows that p ij = 1 ,p ik where i 6 = j 6 = k. T h us, an equilibrium inventory distribution is completely characterized by three steady state proportions | one for each player type.
The model parameterizations that we consider in this study are provided in Table 1 using the notation discussed above. 4 Note that the only parameter values that di er within and across model treatments are the values for u, the utility v alue of consumption. Using these di erent sets of parameter values we will now c haracterize the conditions under which the various pure strategy equilibria of the Kiyotaki Wright model exist.
Consider rst, the case of model A where types i = 1 ; 2; 3 produce goods j = 2 ; 3; 1, respectively.
In this version of the model, it is the actions of type 1 players alone that determine whether a pure strategy equilibrium is labeled as fundamental" or speculative." A player type 1 plays 3 Kehoe, Kiyotaki and Wright 1993 extend the Kiyotaki and Wright 1989 model to allow for mixed strategy and nonstationary equilibria. In this paper, we follow Kiyotaki and Wright 1989 and focus on stationary, pure strategy equilibria. 4 In two experimental sessions discussed below we considered parameterizations that were slightly di erent from the values given in Table 1. fundamental" if he refuses to trade his production good 2 for the higher storage cost good 3. In model A, a type 1 player's steady state best response is to play this fundamental strategy whenever: 5 c 3 , c 2 p 31 , p 21 u=3:
This inequality s a ys that the di erence in storage cost between goods 3 and 2 exceeds the discounted expected utility bene t to player type 1s from storing good 3 rather than good 2. Using our parameterizations for model A, as reported in Table 1 1 If these inequalities hold, then type 1 players' steady state best response is to always play the fundamental strategy. F or the other two t ypes of players, types 2 and 3, the fundamental pure strategy of only trading for lower storage cost goods is a dominant steady state strategy for all valid parameterizations of the model. Of course, all three player types should always o er to trade for their consumption good as well, as they earn the highest possible payo from doing so.
If all three player types always adhere to fundamental trading strategies, the pure strategy equilibrium is referred to as a fundamental equilibrium." In the fundamental equilibrium of model A, type 1 players always refuse to trade their production good 2 for the higher storage cost good 3, type 2 players always o er to trade their production good 3 for the lower storage cost good 1, and type 3 players always refuse to trade their production good 1 for the higher storage cost good 2. Since good 1, the least costly to store good, is accepted in trade by t ype 2 players who do not desire to consume it, good 1 is regarded as a medium of exchange in this equilibrium. The the steady state inventory distribution in this pure strategy equilibrium is given by p 12 = 1 :00, p 21 = 0 :50 and p 31 = 1 :00 implying that p 31 , p 21 = 0 :50. It is easily veri ed that with this inventory distribution, inequality 1 is self ful lling when u = 20; in the case where u = 100, this inequality will be violated, indicating that type 1 players' steady state best response is to pursue a speculative strategy.
In the speculative equilibrium" of model A, type 1 players play the speculative strategy in which they always o er to trade their production good 2 for the higher storage cost good 3. Player types 2 and 3 continue to adhere to fundamental strategies as before. Therefore, both goods 1 and 3 serve as media of exchange in this speculative equilibrium of model A. The resulting steady state inventory distribution is given by p 12 = 0 :71, p 21 = 0 :59 and p 31 = 1 :00, implying that p 31 , p 21 = 0 :41. Again, it is easily veri ed that with this inventory distribution, inequality 1 is violated only when u = 100. It follows that the speculative pure strategy equilibrium, where player type 1s always o er to trade good 2 for good 3, will be self ful lling only when u = 100.
Consider next the case of model B where types i = 1 ; 2; 3 produce goods j = 3 ; 1; 2, respectively.
In this version of the Kiyotaki Wright model, a pure strategy fundamental equilibrium where all three types play fundamental strategies always exists, for all valid parameterizations of the model. In this fundamental equilibrium, player type 1s o er to trade their production good 3 for the lower storage cost good 2, type 2 players refuse to trade their production good 1 for the higher storage cost good 3, and type 3 players o er to trade their production good 2 for the lower storage cost good 1. Thus, both goods 1 and 2 serve as media of media of exchange in the fundamental equilibrium of model B. The fundamental pure strategy equilibrium inventory distribution in model B is given by p 12 = 0 :29, p 23 = 0 :00 and p 32 = 0 :41.
Speculative play is also possible in model B. In contrast to model A, it is player types 2 and 3 who play speculative strategies in the speculative equilibrium" of model B, while player type 1s continue to play the fundamental strategy. Another di erence in model B is that when the speculative pure strategy equilibrium exists, it coexists with the fundamental pure strategy equilibrium, so that within a certain region of the parameter space, there are two possible pure strategy Nash equilibria that agents may c hoose to coordinate on. The conditions under which the speculative equilibrium coexists with the fundamental equilibrium are: c 3 , c 1 p 32 , p 12 u=3; and c 2 , c 1 p 23 u=3:
If both of these inequalities are satis ed, then there exists an equilibrium in which t ype 3 players speculate by refusing to trade their production good 2 for the lower storage cost good 1, and in response, type 2 players speculate by trading their production good 1 for the higher storage cost good 3. Type 1 players continue to adhere to the fundamental strategy in which they always trade their production good 3 for the lower storage cost good 2. In this equilibrium, goods 2 and 3 serve as media of exchange. is easily veri ed, using the inequalities given in 2 3, that this speculative equilibrium distribution will be self ful lling only in the parameterization where u = 500. Thus, the parameterization where u = 500 is one that is consistent with a Nash equilibrium where player type 2s and 3s play speculative strategies, and type 1 players play the fundamental strategy. Of course, both parameterizations, u = 20 and u = 500 are also consistent with the Nash equilibrium where all player types play fundamental strategies.
Experimental Design
In implementing the Kiyotaki Wright e n vironment in the lab we h a ve had to make some simplifying assumptions. To begin with, in our experimental implementation we are constrained to using a nite population of players as opposed to the model's in nite continuum. Another important simpli cation is our use of a nite horizon rather than the in nite horizon of the theory. W e will address the in nite horizon issue later in our discussion.
We h a ve c hosen our nite population of N players to be relatively large, at least by comparison with other experimental studies. However, the size of our experimental populations was constrained by the number of computer workstations available in our experimental laboratory 30, and by the show up rates of student participants. In addition, our population sizes had to be multiples of 6 due to the model's requirement that there be equal numbers of each of the three types and due to the use of pairwise matching. For these reasons, each of our experimental sessions involved group sizes of either 30, 24 or 18 subjects, providing us with either 10, 8, or 6 subjects playing the role of each of the three player types. Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population of the University of Pittsburgh. No subject had any prior experience with the game; subjects were only allowed to participate in a single experimental session.
In each session, subjects were seated at networked computer terminals and were isolated from one another. They received written instructions concerning the game at the beginning of each session. A copy of the instructions used in a representative session is provided in Appendix 1. The written instructions were read aloud and any questions were answered. A single practice game was played to familiarize subjects with the computer interface. Subjects then began to interact with their computer terminal, providing responses when prompted. The computer program that we developed for this experiment performs the random matching of subjects, reports back to subjects on information relevant to their trading decisions, and keeps track of information such as trading decisions, goods in storage, and points earned by each subject.
We report results from 25 experimental sessions involving 636 subjects. A summary of some of the di erent c haracteristics of these experimental sessions is provided in Table 2 . The primary distinctions across sessions, are the model version, A or B, and the utility v alue of consumption, u.
These di erences are indicated in Table 2 . In just one session, number 16, we c hanged the value of the discount factor, , from :90 to :99. The storage costs of the three goods as reported in Table 1 remained constant across all 25 sessions. Given the parameter choices for each session, Table 2 indicates whether the pure strategy equilibrium is unique and either fundamental F or speculative S, or whether both pure strategy equilibria coexist with one another F S. The number of subjects in each session is also given. Certain other characteristics of these experimental sessions, which concern the information subjects had available and the method used to initialize the distribution of goods in storage over player types will be discussed in further detail later in the paper. Each of these 25 experimental sessions consisted of one or more games and each game consisted of a number of bilateral trading rounds. The number of games and trading rounds for each session is reported in Table 2 . Each trading round can be described as follows.
At the beginning of each trading round, subjects are randomly paired by the computer program. Once paired, each subject's computer screen displays some information about the other player with whom they are matched -see Figure 1 , trading round screen number 1. Subjects are asked whether they want to trade the good they have in storage for the good the player with whom they are matched has in storage. Trade occurs only if mutually agreed upon; all trades consist of one for one swaps of the goods the pair of players has in storage.
Figure 1 here
Before making their decisions, players could consider some additional information that was provided on trading round screen number 1 of Figure 1 . In the middle of this screen is a bar chart indicating the cumulative probability that the current game will end 1 to 10 rounds from the current round. The probabilities in this bar chart re ect the constant, one in ten chance .10 probability that the game will randomly end from one round to the next. Our decision to have a random stopping rule for the game was due to two considerations. First, the Kiyotaki Wright model envisions that players are in nitely lived. Second, the model also speci es that agents discount the future using a common discount factor 2 0; 1. The random stopping rule is our way of dealing with both of these features of the Kiyotaki Wright e n vironment. As mentioned earlier, we set" equal to :90 in all but one session. To implement discounting of future payo s by 90, we c hose to end each game with probability 1 , , i.e. with probability 10 at the end of any round that has been reached. 6 The constant .90 probability of the game continuing into the next round implements both discounting and the stationarity associated with an in nitely lived population.
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Our decision to set = :90 is not all that important to our predictions for which t ype of behavior we w ould expect to observe in equilibrium. In particular, if subjects did not discount future earnings at all, i.e. if = 1 :0, the various parameterizations we h a ve c hosen would remain consistent with our predictions for a fundamental F or speculative S equilibrium as indicated in Table 2 .
We informed subjects of this constant 10 probability that the game would end from one round to the next and called their attention to the bar chart revealing the cumulative probability that the game would end in future rounds. 7 The random end to the game reinforces the notion that the time it takes subjects to get the good they desire should also be an important consideration in their trading strategy. 8 At the bottom of trading round screen number 1 is a table indicating the percentage of each player type holding each good as of the end of the last trading round. In all but two sessions which will be discussed later, these percentages are historical average percentages based on the entire history of the current game and are updated at the end of every trading round. This information on the historical average distribution of goods by player type the p ij terms of the theory would be useful to subjects who were attempting to calculate the relative likelihood of meeting another player who both had the good the player desired and who was willing to trade this good for the good the player currently had in storage. This type of information is assumed to be common knowledge in the theoretical Kiyotaki Wright e n vironment. Revealing this information to subjects was our way of implementing this common knowledge assumption.
As mentioned in the introduction, our implementation of discounting and the information we provide players concerning the inventory distributions of goods by t ype distinguishes our experimental analysis of the Kiyotaki Wright model from the previous studies by Marimon et al. 1990 and Brown 1996 . These features of our design are more conducive to speculative behavior in environments where speculation makes sense in that they encourage subjects to consider not only the storage cost of goods, but also to consider the time it will take them to obtain the good they desire, and the relative likelihood of meeting the player who has this good and is willing to engage in trade. Thus we view our experimental design as being somewhat closer in spirit to the Kiyotaki Wright e n vironment, and as providing a best case scenario" for speculation, in those environments designed to encourage speculative behavior.
Once all trading decisions have been made, the results of those decisions are revealed to all 7
Following each trading round, the computer program drew a random number from a uniform distribution over 0; 1 . If this random draw w as less than or equal to :10, the trading round just completed would be the last trading round of the game. Subjects were informed of the outcome of this draw only after they had made their current trading round decisions. To a void overly long games, we also chose to end any game that exceeded 40 rounds. Subjects were not informed of this upper bound. There were only three games in all of our experimental sessions that ever reached this upper bound.
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Subjects are also made aware of the importance of time by the fact that they incur negative net payo s in every trading round in which they do not get the good they desire.
players on trading round screen number 2 of Figure 1 . Notice that at the bottom of this screen, the information on the percentage of each t ype of agent holding each t ype of good has been updated to take account of what has occurred in the just completed round of play.
Players carry the goods they have in storage over into the next round, if there is a next round. If the computer has determined with probability .10 that the just completed round will be the last round of the game, then players see a message at the bottom of trading round screen number 2 indicating that the game has just ended. Otherwise, they see a message informing them that the game will continue with another round. If the game continues, then players are once again randomly paired with one another and are asked to make another trading decision. If the game has ended, each players' point total from that game is stored by the computer and a new game begins. Players begin every new game including the rst with 100 points.
In most of our experimental sessions, players begin each new game with one unit of their production good in storage. This initialization scheme was chosen because it was easy to explain to subjects and because it di ers from any pure strategy steady state distribution of goods over player types. Indeed, with this initialization scheme, there is always an absence of a double coincidence of wants in the rst round of any game which should serve to encourage subjects to begin trading. However, we h a ve also considered a di erent initialization scheme in ve sessions numbers 19 23 of model A where u = 100. In this alternative initialization scheme, the distribution of goods over player types at the start of each new game was made as close as possible with a nite population to the unique, pure strategy`speculative' equilibrium distribution of goods in storage by player type. These two di erent initialization schemes allow for a kind of global versus local stability analysis of the speculative equilibrium of model A, which w e consider later in the paper.
At the beginning of each new game, players may h a ve a good in storage that is di erent from the good they held in storage at the end of the previous game. Moreover, at the beginning of every new game, the table indicating the distribution of goods held by v arious types is re initialized to re ect the initial distribution of goods by t ype in the new game. Thus, in each new game, players e ectively start over" with respect to the information they have a vailable on the historical or current distribution of goods by t ype, and with respect to the total number of points they have earned. However, the parameterization of the game itself does not change, nor does the player's type so that each player can draw upon his or her own past experience in playing the new game.
The number of new games that were played was determined by us and depended simply upon the time available. Subjects were recruited for two hour sessions, but were not told in advance how many games would be played. Because our games ended randomly, the total number of games and trading rounds played varied somewhat across sessions as can be seen in Table 2 ; we attempted to obtain approximately 100 trading rounds per session.
Once it was determined that the last game had been played, the end to the experimental session was announced. The computer program then picked one game at random from all the games played. Subjects' point totals from this game were converted into a probability of winning a $10 prize that was in addition to the $10 they earned for participating in the session. Each additional point subjects earned above the initial 100 points they were given increased their probability o f winning the additional $10 prize by the same amount. Subjects were informed of this mechanism for determining whether they would win the additional $10 prize. They were further instructed that they were not competing with one another|that their probability of winning the additional $10 prize depended only on how many additional points they were able to obtain relative to the maximum number of points a player of their type could have been expected to earn in the game chosen. 9 Additional $10 prizes were then awarded based on a random choice for the cut o probability. Our use of a Roth Malouf 1979 binary lottery to determine actual cash payments is intended to control for subjects' di ering attitudes towards risk.
Aggregate Experimental Results
We begin our review of the results from our experimental sessions by focusing on aggregate behavior by all players of a given type. Table 3 reports the frequency with which players of each t ype o er to trade whatever good they have in storage for the good corresponding to their type|their consumption good| over each half of all 25 sessions. Note that these are not the frequencies with which the three player types actually received their consumption good in trade;rather these are the frequencies with which each t ype o ered to trade for their consumption good when they met another player who held this good in storage. These o er frequencies indicate how w ell players understand their assigned roles and provide some evidence on the saliency of the monetary incentives that we provide. In theory, these o er frequencies should all be 100 since players are told that they receive a positive net payo in points only when they successfully trade for their consumption 9 The maximum expected number of points takes into account a player's type, the number of trading rounds played, and liklihood that a player meets his consumption good in trade. good. Indeed we see that with few exceptions, these o er frequencies are typically close to or even equal to 1.00, especially over the second half of each session.
Model A: Aggregate Results
We begin by considering some aggregate results from our experimental sessions involving model A. We rst compare aggregate results for ve sessions, numbers 1, 4, 10, 12 and 14, in which w e set u = 20 with aggregate results for ve other sessions, numbers 2, 3, 9, 11 and 13, in which w e set u = 100. The only experimental treatment condition that varies between these two groups of ve sessions is the utility v alue of consumption, u; in particular, subjects in all 10 of these sessions began each new game with their production good in storage and were given information on the historical average distribution of goods held in storage by each player type. Table 4 reports the frequency with which each t ype of player in these 10 sessions o ers to trade his model A production good for the good he neither consumes nor produces. When u = 20, the unique pure strategy equilibrium is one where all three types play fundamental strategies. Type 1 players should never o er to trade their production good 2 for the higher storage cost good 3, type 2 players should always o er to trade their production good 3 for the lower storage cost good 1 and type 3 players should never o er to trade their production good 1 for the higher storage cost good 2. The o er frequencies reported in Table 4 indicate that when u = 20, player types 2 and 3 behave roughly in accordance with these equilibrium predictions. However, approximately one third of type 1 players play the speculative strategy, o ering to trade their production good 2 for the relatively higher storage cost good 3.
When u = 100, the equilibrium predictions for player types 2 and 3 are the same as when u = 20, but the equilibrium prediction for player type 1s is that these players will always speculate by o ering to trade their production good 2 for the higher storage cost good 3. Nonparametric, robust rank order tests were conducted using the ve o er frequencies for player type 1s in the sessions with u = 20 and u = 100. 10 The null hypothesis is that there is no di erence in the magnitude of these o er frequencies between the two parameterizations. We nd that we cannot 10 See Siegel and Castellan 1988, pp. 137 44 for an explanation of this nonparametric test. reject this null hypothesis at the .05 signi cance level for either the rst or the second half of all sessions. We conclude that, at the aggregate level, player type 1s do not respond to variations in the utility v alue of consumption u that were intended to elicit fundamental or speculative behavior.
Using robust rank order tests on the o er frequencies of player type 2s over each half of a session, we are also unable to reject at the .05 level the null hypothesis of no di erence in these o er frequencies between the two treatments. However, as noted above, the behavior of player types 2 and 3 should not change as we v ary the value of u. When we apply the robust rank order test to the o er frequencies of player type 3s over each half of a session, we nd that for the second half of all model A sessions, we can reject at the .05 level the null hypothesis of no di erence in o er frequencies between the two treatments in favor of the alternative that o er frequencies are higher in sessions where u = 100 than in sessions where u = 20. This nding runs counter to the theoretical prediction that type 3 behavior will be una ected by v ariations in the value of u.
We next checked whether the conditions that guaranteed the uniqueness of a fundamental or speculative equilibrium were in fact, in place during the course of our experimental sessions involving model A. Recall that in the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of model A, we expect to observe fundamental behavior by player type 1s whenever the inequalities in 1 are satis ed. Thus, it is important t o c heck whether in treatments where u = 20, it was the case that p 31 , p 21 5 6 and in treatments where u = 100, the speculative parameterization where type 1s are called on trade good 2 for good 3 in equilibrium it was the case that p 31 , p 21 1 6 . W e found that the average value of the di erence p 31 , p 21 in all sessions involving model A was always less than 5 6 and was always greater than :167 1 6 . Thus, the theoretical conditions were in place so that on average, a type 1 player's steady state best response would have been to play the fundamental strategy when u = 20 and would have been to play the speculative strategy when u = 100. Whether the type 1 players recognized the di erent incentives that were present in the two di erent e n vironments will be addressed later, when we consider individual learning behavior.
The incentives to play the equilibrium strategies rather than have all players play fundamental strategies when u = 100 are quite large. If all players play fundamental strategies then the expected pattern of trade is such that in the steady state the probability that each player type gets his consumption good in trade in any round is 1=6. However, if type 1s speculate while type 2s and 3s play fundamental then in the steady state the probability that each player type gets his consumption good in trade in any round is 1=6 p 2, an increase of more than 40.
Do subjects respond to these incentives in making strategic choices? Figure 2 displays a comparison of the strategy choices of the three types of players in the 10 model A sessions discussed in Table 4 where = :90 and u = 20 or 100. Our comparison is based on an e ciency score" that we constructed for each player type in every round of these model A sessions. This e ciency score measures the frequency with which players of a given type play`best responses' in trading situations where they 1 have the opportunity to trade for a good that does not correspond to their type, and 2 they do not currently posses the same good in storage. These are the only strategically interesting trading situations. We examined whether each player's strategy was a`best response' to the data on the historical average frequencies with which each t ype stores each good as reported and updated on the subjects' computer screens following each trading round.
In making these`best response' calculations, we assumed that each player acted according to the steady state strategic predictions. That is, we imagined that type 1 players played the fundamental or speculative strategy depending on whether the actual historical distribution of goods over types warranted the play of either strategy. W e assumed that player types 2 and 3's dominant strategy was the equilibrium strategy of always playing the fundamental strategy, regardless of the value of u or the information on the historical distribution of goods over types. 11 For each round, we calculated the average frequency with which players of a given type in the strategically interesting trading situations, have played best responses using all data from the beginning of the session to the current round. These`best response' e ciency scores for the model A sessions are presented in Figure 2 .
Figure 2 here
We see that in most of the sessions where u = 20, player type 1s are approximately as e cient as player types 2 and 3 at playing best responses to historical frequencies. By contrast, in most sessions where u = 100, player type 1s are substantially less e cient at playing best responses than are player types 2 and 3. The lower e ciency scores for player type 1s in the u = 100 sessions arise from the refusal of a large number of type 1 players to engage in the speculative strategy in these sessions.
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We could not think of any other way to model best response behavior, as subjects did not know the distribution of strategies that other subjects were playing. Therefore, we c hose to focus on the steady state strategies.
Robustness of the Aggregate Results for Model A
One feature of our experimental design is that subjects in each session play more than one game. This provides subjects with direct experience of the random determination of the end of a game, a feature that introduces subjects to the discounting that must take place if there is to be a trade o between storage costs and marketability considerations. Subjects began each new game in the model A sessions reported in Table 4 with their production good in storage. Thus, at the beginning of each new game, only type 3 players are storing good 1. This initial condition, if it persisted, w ould make speculative trades by t ype 1 players trades of good 2 for good 3 pro table in model A sessions where u = 20. However, fundamental play b y t ype 2 and 3 players imply that this initial condition will not persist. Nevertheless, since we re initialized inventory holdings at the start of each new game, it is possible that our re initialization may h a ve induced the play o f speculative strategies by t ype 1 players in environments u = 20 where in equilibrium, they should not speculate. Additionally, w e w anted to consider whether the frequency with which games end and new games begin | the expected number of trading rounds per game when = :90 is 10 | may h a ve impeded type 1 players' adoption of the speculative strategy in environments u = 100 where this strategy is the steady state best response.
To c heck whether our re initialization scheme may h a ve led to these kinds of biases in our results, we conducted two additional experimental sessions, involving model A, numbers 15 and 16. In session 15, we set u = 15 rather than u = 20. When u = 15 in our parameterization of model A, inequality 1 becomes p 31 , p 21 10=9, a condition that always holds irrespective of our re initialization scheme. Thus, when u = 15, fundamental behavior by player type 1s is always the dominant steady state strategy. Results from session 15 are reported in Table 5 . A comparison of these results with those reported in Table 4 for sessions 1, 4, 10, 12 and 14 where u = 20 suggests that there is little di erence in behavior, especially over the second half of a session. Session 16 represents an e ort to remove a n y e ect of re initialization by raising the discount factor, , from :90 to :99 thereby increasing the expected length of a game from 10 to 100 rounds. 12
In this session a single game was played that lasted for 58 rounds. This represents an increase of almost 50 in the number of rounds played in any game of any other session. In this session, u was set equal to 100; therefore, the equilibrium prediction is that type 1 players will adopt the speculative strategy. The results from this 58 round game session 16 are reported in Table 6 . A Table 6 with the results reported in Table 4 for sessions 2, 3, 9, 11 and 13 where u also equaled 100 shows that there is little di erence in the behavior of all three types. In particular, player type 1s in session 16 where = :99 do not appear to play speculative strategies any more frequently than they do in sessions where = :90. We conclude that increasing the expected number of rounds that will be played in a game does not appear to promote coordination on a Nash equilibrium. All of the aggregate results for model A discussed thus far involve an initialization scheme in which each player begins each new game with the good that his type produces in storage. As mentioned earlier, an alternative initialization scheme is to begin each new game with a distribution of goods over player types that is as close as possible with a nite population to the steady state distribution. We executed this alternative initialization scheme for the model A treatment where u = 100, as we thought this initialization scheme might help to promote speculation by player type 1s and might also reduce the frequency with which player type 3s engage in speculative trades. We conducted ve model A sessions, numbers 19 23, where u = 100 and the initial distribution of goods over types was made as close as possible to the speculative steady state equilibrium distribution. In these sessions, each player type began each new game with either his production good or the good 12 For session 16, we also increased the maximum number of rounds allowed from 40 to 200. he neither produces nor consumes in storage so that in the aggregate, the distribution of goods over types was close to the speculative steady state distribution. 13 Table 7 presents the aggregate frequency with which each player type o ered to trade his production good for the good he neither consumes nor produces in these ve sessions. Again, a comparison of these frequencies with the frequencies for the model A sessions reported in Table   4 where u = 100 and players began each game with their production good in storage reveals no signi cant di erences. Type 1 players do not speculate any more frequently nor do type 3 players speculate any less frequently when they are initially close to the`speculative' steady equilibrium distribution as compared with when they are not. Robust rank order tests con rm this nding. If we compare the ve aggregate o er frequencies for each player type over each half of a session as reported in Table 7 with the corresponding set of ve o er frequencies reported for the ve sessions of Table 4 where u = 100, we can never reject at the .05 signi cance level, the null hypothesis that both sets of aggregate o er frequencies come from the same distribution. Thus it appears that subject behavior is invariant to the two di erent initialization schemes we consider. As a nal robustness check on the aggregate results we obtained for model A, we altered the information that we reported to subjects concerning the distribution of goods held in storage by each player type. In all of the experimental sessions discussed so far, subjects received information on the historical average distribution of goods held by each player type over all rounds of the current game as of the last trading round. This information was intended to serve a s a p r o xy for 13 The initial proportions we used depended on the number of subjects available. In sessions 19 21, where we had 24 subjects 8 of each t ype, we set p12 = 6 =8, p23 = 3 =8, and p31 = 8 =8. In sessions 22 23 where we had 18 subjects 6 of each t ype, we set p12 = 4 =6, p23 = 2 =6, and p31 = 6 =6. Model A's speculative steady state distribution is: p12 = :71, p23 = :41 and p31 = 1 :0. information on strategic behavior by each player type. However, subjects may h a ve had di culty using the information we g a ve them to infer the distribution of strategies that were being played. Therefore, we conducted two sessions of model A with u = 100, numbers 17 and 18, in which w e gave subjects additional information. In these sessions, we reported the historical average frequency with which t ype i players, with good j 6 = i in storage, o ered to trade good j for good k 6 = j in the current game, as of the last trading round. These 12`strategy frequencies' were presented on the second trading round screen. This strategy information was in addition to the information given on the historical average frequency with which each player type was storing each g o o d , t h us allowing us to compare and contrast the e ect of providing the additional information on strategic behavior. The aggregate o er frequencies from sessions 17 and 18, where subjects had information on strategic behavior, are given in Table 8 . Comparing the o er frequencies in Table 8 with the Table 4 where u = 100 but no strategy information was given, we do not see much di erence. In particular, we continue to nd that less than half of type 1 players play the speculative strategy of trading good 2 for good 3 and a roughly constant n umber of type 3 players choose to play the speculative strategy of trading good 1 for good 2. In two other model A sessions, numbers 24 and 25, we returned to our standard experimental design, where we do not reveal strategy information, and we considered a di erent modi cation to the information we provided to subjects. Rather than providing information on the historical average distribution of goods held in storage by player type, we instead reported the current round to round distribution of goods in storage by player type, and we updated this information at the end of every round. In the later rounds of a game, this information on the current distribution of goods by t ype might be a better predictor of the goods a player is likely to encounter in each new trading round, and may therefore facilitate the play of speculative strategies. The aggregate o er frequencies from sessions 24 25, where players were given the current distribution of goods by t ype are given in Table 9 . Again, we see that there is not much di erence between the aggregate o er frequencies in this new treatment as compared with the o er frequencies of our standard treatment, as reported in Table 4 , where subjects had information on the historical average distribution of goods held by each player type. The ndings of this section suggest that the aggregate results we obtained using our "standard" experimental design for model A, as reported in Table 4 and discussed in section 4.1 are robust to several di erent modi cations. In particular, the results are not an artifact of having many games in which subjects' inventory holdings get re initialized, nor are they a ected by initializing the distribution of goods close to the steady state distribution, nor by the addition of information on strategic behavior or the current distribution of goods held in storage. We will therefore use our standard experimental design, in which = :9, players begin each new game with their production good in storage and are given information on the historical average distribution of goods over player types, to explore some of the equilibrium predictions that emerge from model B.
Model B: Aggregate Results
In contrast to model A, in model B there always exists, for all valid parameterizations of the model, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where all types play fundamental strategies. For a subset of this same parameter space, there also exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where player types 2 and 3 play speculative strategies, while type 1 players continue to play fundamental. We report here aggregate results from two sessions of model B, sessions 5 and 8, where we set u = 20 and we compare these results with results we obtained from two other sessions of model B, sessions 6 and 7, where we set u = 500. The latter two sessions are the only ones in which speculative behavior on the part of player types 2 and 3 is potentially consistent with the theory. Table 10 reports the frequency with which each t ype of player o ers to trade his model B production good for the good that he neither consumes nor produces. The frequencies reported in Table 7 indicate that in sessions 5 and 8 where u = 20, the majority of all three player types follow fundamental trading strategies in accordance with the theoretical equilibrium prediction. Moreover, this preference for the fundamental strategy appears to become stronger in the second half of each of these two sessions. In particular, we see that most type 1 players o er to trade their production good 3 for the lower storage cost good 1, most type 2 players refuse to trade their production good 1 for the higher storage cost good 3 and most type 3 players o er to trade their production good 2 for the lower storage cost good 1. Finally, w e note that the tendency of all types to play fundamental strategies in sessions 5 and 8 of model B appears to be somewhat stronger especially in the second half of each session than was the case for the model A sessions reported in Table 4 where u = 2 0 and the fundamental equilibrium was also the unique Nash equilibrium.
In the two sessions 6 and 7 where u = 500, we see an increased tendency on the part of all three player types to play speculative strategies relative to the case where u = 20. However, the frequency of speculative play b y player types 2 and 3 remains far from the 100 frequency that is required for a speculative Nash equilibrium. While the behavior of player types 2 and 3 is in the direction of the speculative equilibrium, the behavior of type 1 players is not; for type 1 players, the fundamental strategy remains the dominant strategy regardless of the parameterization of model B. 14 Thus, when u = 500, there appears to be no evidence that players move closer to the speculative equilibrium of model B, nor is there any evidence that players move t o ward a mixed strategy equilibrium, as the behavior of type 1 players is inconsistent with either of these two conjectures. 15 As we did for model A, we also checked whether the conditions were in place to guarantee the uniqueness of the fundamental equilibrium of model B or to allow the speculative equilibrium of model B to coexist with the fundamental equilibrium. It is easily veri ed that the rst inequality in 2 that is necessary for a speculative equilibrium to coexist with the fundamental equilibrium is always violated when u = 20 since the di erence, p 32 , p 12 , cannot exceed 1:0 b y de nition. Furthermore, we found that the second inequality in 2 involving p 23 also fails to hold, on average, in the two sessions 5 and 8 where u = 20. Therefore, in both sessions 5 and 8 the conditions were such that the fundamental equilibrium could be regarded as the unique Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, w e v eri ed that in the sessions where u = 500 sessions 6 and 7, the inequalities in 3 were satis ed, o n a verage, over all rounds of these two sessions. Therefore, in both sessions 6 and 7, the conditions necessary for the speculative equilibrium to coexist with the fundamental equilibrium were in place, on average, over all rounds of these two sessions.
The multiplicity of pure strategy steady state equilibria in the model B environment, in particular, the existence of a fundamental pure strategy equilibrium for all parameter values, makes alternative experimental treatments intended to encourage the play of speculative strategies less useful in the model B environment. For this reason, we h a ve not pursued such alternative treatments as we did in section 4.2 for model A. We simply note that our aggregate ndings for model A appear to carry over to the model B environment with its di erent distribution of production goods over player types.
Learning Behavior
The evidence presented thus far suggests that certain player types are not responding to incentives to play speculative rather than fundamental strategies. In particular, players do not appear to be too concerned with assessing the relative marketability of various goods. The question we address in this section is whether players are in fact responding to marketability concerns, as the theory implies, or whether there may be some other explanation for players' behavior over time. In an e ort to answer this question we focus on the strategic behavior of players who must decide whether to trade for a good that is not their consumption good, and is di erent from the good they currently hold in storage.
Denote by s i jk the strategy chosen by player type i who has good j 6 = i in storage and who meets a player with good k 6 = j; i. Let Our analysis of trading behavior focuses on two explanatory variables that may play a role in the interesting trading situations. The rst variable we consider, NETPAY jk is constructed as follows. We rst calculate the number of times, up to the current round of a session, that a player of type i had good j in storage, met another player with the good he desired, good i, and successfully traded good j for good i. This is simply the number of times that holding good j has resulted in a successful trade for the good desired, good i. 16 Denote this number of successes by: success ji . W e also calculated the number of times, up to the current round of a session, that a player of type i had good j in storage, met another player with the desired good i and was not successful in trading good j for good iSimilarly, for the other good k 6 = j; i that may be held in storage, we calculated the statistics success ki and fail ki for every player at every round. Using these statistics, we can de ne a measure of each player's net payo from holding good j in storage as success ji , fail ji and likewise for good k the net payo measure is success ki ,fail ki . We assume that a player with good j in storage, facing good k in storage, will be responsive to the di erence in net payo s from holding onto good j as opposed to trading for good k. This payo di erence is captured by our NETPAY jk variable, which is de ned as:
NETPAY jk = success ji , fail ji , success ki , fail ki : 16 Note that we are supposing that players only pay attention to the good they had in storage when they successfully traded for the good they desire; in particular, we are implicitly assuming that players do not assign any credit to the chain of goods they may h a ve held in storage prior to their holding the good they held in storage when they successfully traded for the good they desire.
The NETPAY jk variable captures the success of the strategy of storing good j relative to the success of the strategy of storing good k. As it is based on past successful and failed e orts to trade for the desired good, it captures the notion that players weigh the past performance of holding one or the other of two goods in storage when they choose strategies for those encounters where they are facing a nontrivial trading decisions. Our NETPAY v ariable thus serves as a proxy for reinforcement based e ects on player behavior. Such reinforcement e ects serve as the primary mechanism through which individual learning is modeled in a variety of adaptive learning schemes, including the classi er system of Marimon et al. 1990 . Indeed, information about past payo performance is typically the only kind of information that agents have in reinforcement based learning models.
Information about the relative past performance of di erent strategies, however, is not the only information that is relevant to players in the Kiyotaki Wright model. Of crucial importance is the perceived marketability of the various goods that players may hold in storage. As discussed in section 3 we h a ve provided subjects with the information necessary to make assessments of relative marketability b y revealing to them the historical average distribution of goods held in storage by the three player types. To test whether this type of information is relevant to the strategies chosen by the experimental subjects, we constructed some measures of the relative marketability o f v arious goods that made use of the actual historical average frequencies that players observed on their computer screens in theoretically relevant w ays. We constructed these marketability v ariables for player type 1s in model A, and for player types 2 and 3 in model B.
In model A, type 1 players are concerned with the relative marketability of the two goods they may hold in storage good 2 or good 3. From 1 we know that the di erence p 31 , p 21 m ust be less than a certain threshold value 5 6 when u = 2 0 a n d 1 6 when u = 100 for fundamental behavior by player type 1s to be a best response to the fundamental behavior of player type 2s and 3s. Therefore, we constructed the marketability v ariables for player type 1s P21P3156 = p 21 , p 31 + 5 6 ; P21P3116 = p 21 , p 31 + 1 6 ; using the actual historical frequency values for p 21 and p 31 that were revealed to all subjects on their computer screens prior to every trading decision. By construction, player type 1s should play the fundamental strategy in treatments where u = 20 whenever P21P3156 0 and in treatments where u = 100 whenever P21P3116 0; they should play the speculative strategy in the two treatments whenever these two "marketability v ariables" are negative.
Similarly, in model B, we constructed marketability v ariables for player types 2 and 3 in accordance with the inequalities given in 2 3. For type 2 players in model B, we constructed the marketability v ariables marketability v ariables are jointly positive, the incentives are such that player types 2 and 3 should play fundamental strategies. When these variables are jointly negative, the speculative equilibrium coexists with the fundamental equilibrium, so that in equilibrium we m a y observe player types 2 and 3 engaging in speculative strategies. 17
Our learning model is that the realization of the strategy variable, s i jk = 0 for fundamental behavior, and =1 for speculative behavior can be modeled as a linear function of 1 the relative past success of the strategy as measured by the appropriate NETPAY jk variable, 2 the appropriate marketability v ariable, 3 a constant term and 4 session dummy v ariables for observations from each di erent experimental session within a treatment. Since our learning model involves a discrete dependent v ariable, we estimated our model using a logistic regression analysis.
Player Type 1s in Model A
We rst consider how w ell our learning model captures the behavior of player type 1s in model A. Tables 11a 11b report logistic regression results for our learning model using pooled data for type 17 Note that these predictions for the marketability v ariable are similar to those for the marketability v ariable de ned for type 1 players in model A.
1 players. The type 1 player data in Table 11a are taken from the 5 sessions of our "standard" experimental design where u = 20 session numbers 1, 4, 10, 12 and 14 and type 1 player data in Table 11b are taken from the 5 sessions of our standard experimental design where u = 100 session numbers 2, 3, 9, 11 and 13. The type 1 player strategies are divided up according to whether the type 1 player had good 2 in storage and faced good 3, s 1 23 , or had good 3 in storage and faced good 2, s 1 32 . The logistic regressions in Table 11 estimate the probability with which t ype 1 players in either trading situation play the fundamental strategy, i.e. the probability that s 1 ij = 0; therefore, we w ould expect to nd positive coe cients on the netpay and marketability v ariables due to the way these explanatory variables are de ned. The tables report the coe cient estimates from each logistic regression and the associated standard errors as well as the p values from a Wald test of whether the explanatory variables excluding the intercept are jointly di erent from zero. Since there were 5 experimental sessions for each treatment, we also included 4 session dummies in each regression. The coe cient estimates for these dummy regressors have been omitted from Table 11 . Note also that we considered two di erent speci cations of our learning model: one speci cation includes the NETPAY 23 variable and the other does not.
Consider rst, the strategic behavior of type 1 players who are storing their production good 2 when they meet another player with good 3, i.e. s 1 23 . W e see that regardless of whether u = 2 0 Table 11a or u = 100 Table 11b , the coe cient on the NETPAY 23 variable is always positive and signi cantly di erent from zero, indicating that player type 1s are more likely to play the fundamental strategy in which they refuse to trade good 2 for good 3 the higher is the net payo from holding good 2 relative to the net payo from holding good 3. We also see that when u = 20, the coe cient on the relevant marketability v ariable P21P3156 is positive and signi cantly di erent from zero indicating that type 1 players are more likely to play the fundamental strategy when P21P3156 0 and they are less likely to play the fundamental strategy when P21P3156 0 as the theory predicts. By contrast, when u = 100, the coe cient on the relevant marketability variable, P21P3116, is not signi cantly di erent from zero indicating that in the environment where the theory predicts that Player type 1s will play the speculative strategy in equilibrium, these Player 1s are, in fact, ignoring information about marketability that is critical to their adoption of the speculative strategy. Notice further that the marketability v ariable, P21P3116, remains insigni cant when we eliminate the NE TPA Y 23 variable from the model speci cation. These regression results provide some further insight i n to our aggregate nding that the majority of Player type 1s refuse to play the speculative strategy in the environment u = 100 where speculative play is a best response.
Consider next, the strategic behavior of player type 1s who have good 3 in storage when they meet another player with good 2, i.e. s 1 32 . Here the type 1 player's fundamental strategy, s 1 32 = 0 , i s to o er to trade good 3 for good 2, while their speculative strategy is to refuse to trade. 18 In Table   11a , we see that in the treatment where u = 20, both the NETPAY 23 and P21P3156 variables are positive and signi cant in explaining Player 1 actions. However, when u = 100, Table 11b reveals that none of our explanatory variables are signi cant in explaining the behavior of player type 1s with good 2 who face good 3. Note that these same results continue to hold when we purge the NETPAY 23 variable from the regression models for s 1 32 . Finally, w e consider whether the marketability v ariable, P21P3116, remains insigni cant i n logit regressions that use the data from the ve sessions of model A where u = 100 and the initial distribution of goods over types was made as close as possible to the speculative steady state equilibrium distribution. Using pooled data from these ve sessions, numbers 19 23, we constructed the same dependent and independent v ariables used in Table 11b and repeated the same logit regressions. The results are presented in Table 11c . We see, once again, that marketability concerns do not seem to be important to subjects even when they start close to the speculative steady state distribution of goods over types as evidenced by the insigni cant coe cient estimates on the P21P3116 variable in all regressions reported in Table 11c .
It thus appears that player type 1s are not responding to marketability concerns in environments where speculative behavior is their unique, steady state best response. The only consistently signi cant determinant o f t ype 1 behavior is the relative past payo performance of the two strategies, as measured by the variable NETPAY 23 . As reported below, the same result obtains for player types 2 and 3 in model B, who may also choose to play speculative o ver fundamental strategies in certain circumstances.
Player Types 2 and 3 in Model B
Recall that player types 2 and 3 are the only types who may rationally choose to speculate in our parameterization of model B where u = 500. We rst consider how w ell our model explains the behavior of player type 2s and we then consider the behavior of player type 3s. Tables 12a 12b report logistic regression results for our learning model using pooled data on type 2 players in model B sessions. In Table 12a , the pooled, type 2 player data are taken from the 2 sessions numbers 5 and 8 where u = 20, and in Table 12b , the pooled type 2 player data are taken from the 2 sessions numbers 6 and 7 where u = 500. Consider rst, the actions taken by t ype 2 players with good 1 who face good 3, s 2 13 the rst two columns of results in Tables 12a 12b. Recall that s 2 13 = 0 when type 2 players refuse to o er their good 1 for good 3 i.e. they play fundamental and similarly, s 2 31 = 0 when type 2 players o er to trade their good 3 for good 1 play fundamental. We see that for both treatments, u = 20 and u = 500, the NETPAY 13 variable, which captures the net payo from holding good 1 relative to the net payo from holding good 3, is positive and statistically signi cant in explaining the actions of player type 2s with good 1 who face good 3 in trade. However, the relevant marketability v ariables, P21P3243 and P12P32475 are not statistically signi cant from zero in the regressions that include the NETPAY 13 variable. When the NETPAY 13 variable is suppressed, we see that for the two sessions where u = 20, the marketability variable P12P3243 is now statistically signi cant and positive, indicating that player type 2s are more likely to refuse to trade good 1 for good 3 to play fundamental when the marketability variable P12P3243 indicates that fundamental play is the unique best response. 19 Notice however, that in the two sessions where u = 500, the marketability v ariable P12P32475 remains statistically insigni cant when we eliminate the NETPAY 13 variable from the regression speci cation. Thus in environments where player type 2s may rationally choose to play speculative strategies, we see once again that marketability considerations do not appear to be a signi cant concern of the players.
Looking next at the strategic behavior of player type 2s with good 3 who face good 1 in trade, s 2 31 , the third and fourth columns of results in Tables 9a 9b we see that our learning model performs rather poorly in both treatments. None of our explanatory variables are signi cant i n explaining the strategic behavior of player type 2s in this case. We attribute these poor results to the relatively small numbers of player type 2s who found themselves in this trading situation. We turn next to the behavior of player type 3s in model B. Tables 13a 13b report logistic regression results for our learning model using pooled data on type 3 players in model B sessions. The pooled, type 3 player data in Table 13a are taken from the 2 sessions numbers 5 and 8 where u = 20, and the pooled type 3 player data in Table 13b are taken from the 2 sessions numbers 6 and 7 where u = 500. Here we h a ve that s 3 21 = 0 when type 3 players o er to trade their good 2 for good 1 i.e. they play fundamental and similarly, s 3 12 = 0 when type 3 players refuse to trade their good 1 for good 2 play fundamental. We see again that only past relative p a yo di erences, as measured by the variable NETPAY 12 , seem to matter in explaining type 3 behavior across treatments and in di erent trading situations.
From our results for player type 2s and 3s in model B, we conclude that, like player ty p e 1 s i n model A, these players are not responding to marketability considerations when choosing trading strategies, and instead appear to be mainly motivated by past relative p a yo performance.
Conclusions
The Kiyotaki Wright 1989 model environment captures the essential role of media of exchange in overcoming search costs when production is specialized and distribution is decentralized. In this 19 In treatments where u = 20, the variable P 12P3243 is, by construction, always positive; unlike other marketability variables, it can never be negative. It follows that fundamental play b y player type 2s with good 1 facing good 3 is always the unique best response when u = 20. Furthermore, the variable NETPAY13 is always positive in the two sessions of model B where u = 20; this has the e ect of reinforcing fundamental play b y player type 2s with good 1 who face good 3. Indeed, in the two sessions where u = 20, the correlation between P 12P3243 and NETPAY13 is :15. In our other treatments, the correlation between the marketability and netpay v ariables is typically closer to zero. Thus, we usually nd that the marketability v ariable remains insigni cant when we purge the netpay v ariable from our regression speci cation. environment, no one can secure their own consumption good unless some individuals are willing to accept in trade a commodity that they do not wish to consume themselves. An agent who accepts in trade a good other than that agent's consumption good must believe that he is in a better position with respect to the future having made the trade than he would have been if the trade were refused. It is these beliefs that give rise to the general acceptability of a commodity as a medium of exchange. Kiyotaki and Wright show that if agents form their beliefs about the expected pro tability of holding any given commodity rationally, then an agent m ust take i n to account i the per period cost of holding that commodity, ii the utility gained from securing that agent's consumption good, and iii the likelihood of meeting someone who is holding that agent's consumption good and is willing to accept the good that agent is currently holding in exchange. The central question addressed in this paper is: do agents who are placed in the Kiyotaki-Wright environment behave as if they were forming their beliefs in this way?
Prior simulations by Marimon et al. 1990 demonstrated that agents who followed an adaptive learning algorithm would endogenously generate media of exchange in the Kiyotaki-Wright environment. However, this population of arti cial agents tended to settle into fundamental strategies even when the rational expectations equilibrium required one or more of the types to follow a speculative strategy. That is, agents who are programmed to only respond to past payo s do not generate the patterns of behavior that would support fully rational beliefs in the KiyotakiWright e n vironment. A similar pattern of behavior was also observed in a behavioral experiment by Brown 1996. However, Brown's experiment does not incorporate all of the features of the Kiyotaki Wright e n vironment, and does not allow for a comparative static analysis.
Our experimental design was intended to provide as close an approximation to the KiyotakiWright e n vironment as is possible in a laboratory setting. Several notable features of our design were our consideration of di erent treatments and model versions, our e ort to induce risk neutrality b y p a ying subjects according to a binary lottery, our e ort to implement an in nite horizon environment with constant discounting and nally, our e ort to implement the common knowledge assumption by informing subjects of the historical average proportions of goods held by each player type in the population. All of these features have been missing from previous analyses. The last two, in particular, would seem to be crucial to agents' ability t o a c hieve coordination on a speculative equilibrium.
We found that the modi cations we made to the experimental environment in order to map the theoretical environment as closely as possible had little in uence on behavior. Our subjects showed a pronounced tendency to play fundamental strategies regardless of treatment conditions. When subjects did respond to increases in the utility v alue of consumption by increasing the frequency with which they played speculative strategies, this was often done by agent t ypes who in theory, ought not to have speculated. The dominance of fundamental strategies was una ected by our e orts to initialize inventory holdings so that they were close to the speculative equilibrium distribution of goods and was also una ected by v arious di erent information treatments intended to promote speculative play. A t the individual level, behavior re ected a response to di erences in past payo s as assumed in reinforcement learning models, but did not re ect any response to di erences in marketability conditions as required by fully rational" Bayesian models.
The negative results we nd with regard to the equilibrium predictions of the Kiyotaki Wright 1989 model should be interpreted with care. It may v ery well be that the way in which this particular model frames the dynamic problem for agents does not make the nature of the trade o between reducing current storage costs and increasing future expected payo s particularly transparent. Furthermore, the sharp distinction between the patterns of behavior that are generated by adaptive behavior and those generated by fully rational agents that is observed in this model is not necessarily characteristic of other search theoretic models of money. 20 Finally, while we have done some robustness checking, we h a ve, as in any experimental study, considered only a few di erent parameterizations of the Kiyotaki Wright model and we h a ve not considered all possible information treatments, as time and budget limitations prohibit such an endeavor.
If, on the other hand, our experimental implementation of the Kiyotaki Wright model incorporates in a sharp and clear manner the essence of the kinds of trade o s that are inherent in dynamic environments, then our ndings have broader implications that extend beyond the search theoretic framework that we consider. In particular, our results appear to call into question the empirical usefulness of the comparative dynamic implications derived from models where individual decisions are characterized by solutions to dynamic programming problems. Indeed, much remains to be learned about the range of empirically valid propositions that can be gleaned from dynamic optimization models including search theoretic models of money.
Appendix 1
This appendix provides the written instructions that were given to subjects in experimental sessions 2, 3, 9, 11 and 13. The instructions for other sessions are similar. These written instructions were read aloud prior to the beginning of play. In addition, a single practice trading round was played in order to familiarize subjects with the computer interface.
INSTRUCTIONS

General
You are about to participate in an experiment in economic decision making. Funding for this experiment has been provided by the National Science Foundation. Please read these instructions carefully. If you have a n y questions please feel free to ask. We ask that you not talk with one another during the experiment.
This experimental session is divided up into a number of games. Each game consists of a number of rounds.
Participants in this session have been divided up equally into one of three di erent t ypes: type 1, type 2 or type 3. Your type was chosen randomly at the beginning of the session and will be indicated in the top left corner of your computer screen. Your type will not change for the duration of the session.
In addition to the three di erent t ypes of players, there are also three di erent t ypes of goods: good 1, good 2, and good 3.
Each player begins each game with 100 points and one unit of the good that he or she produces" in storage. Each player type produces a good that is di erent from his or her type:
Player Type Produces  1  Good 2  2  Good 3  3 Good 1 Players may continue to hold the good they produce in storage, or they may exchange this good for one unit of the good held in storage by another player. Exchanges are always one for one.
Your Objective
Your objective i n e v ery round of every game is to get as many points as possible. You earn a positive n umber of points only when you obtain the good corresponding to your type. Thus, type 1 players will want to obtain as many units as possible of good 1, type 2 players will want to obtain a many units as possible of good 2, and type 3 players will want to obtain as many units as possible of good 3. Storing goods costs you points. Storing good 1 costs you 1 point per round, storing good 2 costs you 4 points per round and storing good 3 costs you 9 points per round. The more points you earn the greater is your probability of winning an additional prize of $10 for a total of $20. Since each player produces a good that is di erent from his or her type, players must trade to get the good that corresponds to their type. Notice that no player of type j produces the good desired by the player type who produces good j. Therefore, to get the good corresponding to your type, you may h a ve to engage in more than one trade.
Each game consists of a sequence of rounds. We will now describe how a round is played.
The Play of A Round
In each round, players of all types are randomly paired with one another. On the rst screen that you see, you are told the type of the player with whom you are matched in the current trading round, and the type of good that this other player has in storage. You are also reminded of the good you currently hold in storage. If the other player agrees, you may trade the goods that you both have in storage. You are asked: Once all players have made their trading decisions, a second screen appears that tells you the outcome of the last round. There are three possible outcomes for each trading round:
1. You proposed to trade, your proposal was accepted, and you received the good corresponding to your type. In this case, you earn a positive net payo in points as determined in Table 1 below. You receive 100 points for obtaining the good that corresponds to your type minus the storage cost for storing a unit of the good you produce. Whenever you receive the good corresponding to your type, you immediately produce a new unit of your production good so that at the end of the round, the good you have in storage is your production good. 2. You proposed to trade, your proposal was accepted and you received in trade a good that does not correspond to your type. In this case, you lose a certain numb e r o f p o i n ts corresponding to the storage cost of the good you received from the other player as determined in Table 2 below. The good you now h a ve in storage is the good you received from the other player. Table 2 Good Storage Cost Per Round 1 1 point 2 4 points 3 9 points 3. You or the player with whom you were matched chose not to trade. In this case no trade occurs. The good you now h a ve in storage does not change from the previous round. You lose a certain numb e r o f p o i n ts corresponding to the storage cost of the good you hold in storage, as determined by T able 2. Note that at the end of every round of every game you always have in storage one unit of a good that does not correspond to your type. Therefore, in every round, you always lose a certain number of points corresponding to the storage cost of the good you have in storage as determined by T able 2. You earn a positive net payo in points, as determined in Table 1 , only when you obtain the good that corresponds to your type.
When does a game continue and when does it end?
After the outcome of the previous round has been revealed to all players, a random numb e r i s d r a wn from the interval 1 to 100. If this random number is less than or equal to 90, the game continues on with another round. If the random number is greater than 90, the just completed round will be the last round of the game. Thus, after every round there is a one in ten chance that the game will not continue into the next round. The bar chart in the middle of the trading screen re ects the probability that the game will end 1 10 rounds from the current round.
When a game ends, you will see a message on your screen. You will be told your point total for that game. Then, depending on the time available, a new game will begin. You will start the new game with 100 points and the good you produce in storage.
Strategic Considerations
Before making your trading decisions, you may w ant t o t a k e account of some of the information that is available to you on the rst screen that you see.
At the top of this screen, you are reminded of your type, the round number, and your new point total for the current game, as of the last trading round. You are also reminded that you receive 100 points for the good corresponding to your type, and the costs in points for storing a unit of each of the three goods in every round. You may w ant to take these storage costs into account when deciding whether or not to trade the good you currently have in storage.
In the middle of your screen is a bar chart indicating the cumulative probability that the game will end 1 to 10 rounds from the current round. This chart re ects the 1 in 10 chance that the game will end from one round to the next. Observe that this probability is increasing, indicating that it is increasingly likely the game will end 1 to 10 rounds from the current round. Since the game may end soon, you may not be able to meet with a player who is willing to trade for the good you currently have in storage. Therefore, in addition to considering storage costs, you may also want to consider the time it will take y ou to trade for the good that corresponds to your type, when choosing whether or not to trade the good you currently have in storage.
At the bottom of your screen you will see a table listing the percent o f e a c h t ype of player that is storing each t ype of good. These percentages are average percentages over all rounds that have been played in the current game, and are updated at the end of every trading round. You may want to use this information in making an estimate of how long it will take y ou to meet a player who both has the good corresponding to your type, and who will want to trade it for the good you currently have in storage, or for some other good you could get in trade.
Earnings
All subjects who complete this 2 hour experimental session are guaranteed to receive a $10 payment. Depending on how many points you earn, it is possible for you to earn an additional $10 prize for a total of $20.
Following the last game of the session, your point total from one game, chosen at random from all of the games that you played, will be converted into a probability of winning the additional $10 prize. You will have a positive probability of winning the $10 prize if your point total from the game chosen exceeds the initial total of 100 points that you are given at the beginning of every game. If your point total in a game falls below the initial 100 point total, your probability of winning the $10 prize is 0 if that game is the one chosen at random. Your probability of winning the $10 prize depends only on how many additional points you were able to obtain in the game chosen relative to the maximum number of points that were obtainable in this same game for a player of your type. Y ou are not competing with other players for the $10 prize. Each o f y ou could win the $10 prize if you earned enough additional points in the game chosen. Note that each additional point y ou earn over the 100 initial points you are given increases your probability of winning the $10 prize by same amount. Thus, the more points you earn in a game over the initial point total of 100, the greater is your probability of winning the $10 prize, if that game is chosen at random. Since you do not know at the outset of play what game will be chosen at random, your objective i n e v ery game should be to obtain as many points as is possible. You earn 20 points per unit of good 2 you obtain. It costs 1 point per round for storing good 1. It costs 4 points per round for storing good 2. It costs 9 points per round for storing good 3.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN?
In the last round you had good 1 in storage. You were matched with a player of type 1. This player had good 2 in storage. You proposed to trade your good 1 for the other player's good 2. The other player agreed to trade.
You received a net payoff of 11 points for the round. Type 1  Type 2  Type 3 Session 13, u=100, N=24
